National Intelligence Council - Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa's Future Part II

National Intelligence Council - 

Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa’s Future 

(A Vital Document for National Digest)

Part II

The African State

Most territorially defined African states will continue to exist formally in 2020.  While there may be boundary changes in Sudan, Somalia, and a few other places, the legal map of Africa will not change significantly.  However, the informal map of power will become more confused.  Some African governments will continue to consolidate administrative capabilities and military might andwill therefore have substantially more ability to influence their own citizens andneighbors in the next 15 years.  Other countries will continue to lose capabilities, largely because of persistent revenue crisis and the ability of non-state actors including NGOs, traditional leaders, insurgents, criminals, andterrorists, to operate in areas where the formal presence of government is limited. These “archipelago states” may constitute the plurality of all countries in Africa as it will be relatively common for the capital informally to cede control over parts of their hinterland, especially since globalization constantly pushes economic activity to the capital, or the few

major urban, agglomerations.  A certain number of African states will also essentially be taken over by the international community.  While it is doubtful that any African states will become long-term trustees of the UnitedNations, international supervision of some failedor failing states will become more common andaccepted.

Those African countries that fail are unlikely to receive significant assistance from international peacekeepers.  South Africa andother African militaries have only limitedpeacekeeping capabilities.  While international commitment to peacekeeping is likely to increase, it probably will not keep up with African demand.  When foreigners intervene, they are usually best at reconstituting order in the cities.  The rural areas in countries that have been “peacekept” tend to remain ungovernedfor years.  The international community has also found it easier to intervene

in small countries, for obvious reasons.  Large countries that spiral downward are therefore likely to have especially complicated maps of power where vast areas may be formally ungoverned.

A few aspects of state territoriality will “harden” in the next 15 years.  It is likely, for instance, that refugees will findan increasingly hostile reception amongst nominal host governments. Many African governments have learnedthat conflicts in neighboring countries can drag on for many years andthat a commitment to house refugees can be a very long-term commitment. Refugees have also been a cause of destabilization in many areas.

Patterns of Conflict

Africa was the site of much of the military conflict in the worldin the 1990s andthere is no

reason to believe that its share of worldviolence will change appreciably in the next 15 years.

As in the past, most African conflicts will be internal, although the pattern of outsiders intervening in civil wars, either to help one of the protagonists or to protect themselves from the fallout of the conflict, will continue.  African governments andrebels will continue to take advantage of the international market for basic weapons and, increasingly, logistics and higher- order military functions such as aerial reconnaissance.

Most African countries will not be able significantly to increase the prowess of their security forces, in goodpart because of continuedlow economic growth andthe paucity of foreign military assistance.  The impact of HIV-AIDS on militaries may also constitute a destabilizing force.  Indeed it is likely that formal militaries in many countries will undergo further significant atrophy, occasionally to be replacedoutright by informal militias that are recruited opportunistically by leaders when there is a threat.  Such armed civilians will inevitably destabilize their own countries and be an enormous threat to their fellow citizens.  However, a few African countries that already have capable military forces (e.g., Angola) will be able to continue to increase the prowess and, perhaps, the size of their armed forces, encouraged, in part, by the departure from African of some traditional powers.

Terrorism

Given that significant portions of Africa—those areas outside the nations’ capitals—will

essentially be ungoverned, there will be many opportunities for terrorist groups that threaten the West to seek haven across the continent.  However, it is unlikely that Africa will become much of a supplier of international terrorists because of the profound differences between the Islam practicedin Africa andthat in the Middle East.  Nor will terrorist groups findsupportive governments in Africa akin to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  However, those terrorists groups seeking sanctuary for their fugitive principals or who want to hide dangerous weapons may findthe distant regions of some African countries inviting precisely because they are unlikely to be interrupted by government.  The ability of terrorists to use Africa as safehaven only naturally increases the probability that these armed groups will seek to attack soft Western and Israeli targets on the continent.  The likelihood of foreign terrorist groups operating in Africa is reduced, however, by the relative absence of effective communication links with the outside world, essential to international terrorist operations, and by the threat that these foreign groups wouldbecome miredin domestic conflicts.

Indeed, an overwhelming majority of terrorism in Africa will be caused by indigenous groups waging war against their own or neighboring governments or against other population groups, defined by religion or ethnicity.  Indeed, most wars in Africa today seldom see armed, uniformed combatants fighting each other but are much more likely to involve poorly trainedsoldiers or guerrillas terrorizing local populations.  The tendency for those killed in African conflicts to be women, children, and other civilians is likely to remain or perhaps get worse.

African countries will actively seek the increasing amount of available Western counterterrorism funding, especially given the threat from international terrorists to their own domestic situations even if the targets are foreigners.  For instance, the attacks in Mombassa on Israeli targets in

2002 undoubtedly hurt Kenya far more than Israel, as international tourism to East Africa was dealt a stunning blow.

Everyday Violence

The less understood aspect of violence in Africa is the everyday threats that an increasing

number of citizens face.  Africa will continue to become far more dangerous as the supply of machine guns, rocket-propelledgrenades, andmortars becomes even easier to access.  The increasingly number of unemployed andimpoverishedwill further increase the level of crime andgeneral insecurity.  There is also no reason at present to believe that the police in most African countries will become more adept, especially given the funding crisis that most African countries will face.  However, states with high levels of violence will not automatically be failed states; indeed, the ability of African countries to continue to muddle along despite high levels of violence should not be underestimated.  For instance, 20,000 people have been killed in Nigeria while that country has maintained its democratic façade.  Thousands have also died in Congo during the periodwhen all formal fighting was supposedto have ended.

The NIC 2020 report argues that pervasive insecurity will occur across large parts of the worldas economic andpolitical processes upset traditional practices.  Insecurity will be very high in Africa, although it is more likely to stem from political conflict andcrime rather than economic change, which has the potential for a significant upside.

Democracy in Africa

Most countries in Africa will continue to holdmultiparty elections on a regular basis, although

these elections will continue to vary considerably in quality.  Almost all countries across the continent will continue to proclaim a public adherence to democracy and no other form of government will significantly challenge the nominal allegiance to regular elections.  The media will continue, in most countries, to reflect a variety of viewpoints.  The continuedliberalization of radio and television will produce a cacophonous stream of African political views. The impact on domestic politics of this liberalization is difficult to assess, although it can be expected to produce more visibly contentious processes of government, particularly given greater vitality in the NGO sector. NGOs are increasingly the loyal opposition in the African polity given weak institutions andimmature methods of parliamentary practice.

Typology of Democratic Achievement

However, commitment to democracy in Africa will remain a “mile wide and inch thick.”

Therefore, the critical determinants of democratic success will be the social coalition that actually is actively in favor of democracy.  The democratic consolidators will make significant gains in improving their democratic performance.  Indeed, multiparty elections will become institutionalizedin these countries andthey will improve the operations of their parliaments, courts, andother institutions.  By 2020, for this set of African countries, any turnback from democracy will be almost inconceivable.

It is likely that the countries making the most progress on democracy are the ones that have already had free and fair elections.  Democratic consolidations will, on average, be in the coastal countries, where relatively strong civil societies are committedto democracy andhave already spent a decade or more (as was the case in both Ghana and Kenya) pushing authoritarian rulers aside. The “plateauing” of African states—that is, the difficulty states confront in changing their relative democratic performance over the next 15 years—is due largely to structural factors that determine the size of the urban-based elite demanding democratization.  In most countries, this

elite has now exercised whatever power that it can.  As a result, there are unlikely to be too many democratic surprises over the next 15 years.

The advantage of coastal countries that have elements of civil society committed to democratization can be seen when comparing Kenya with Uganda.  Although Uganda stabilized in the late 1980s andhas hadexcellent economic performance for the past 15 years, it has lagged on democratic performance and is one of the few African countries where there is still an argument about the benefits of multiparty democracy.  Kenya experienced authoritarian rule for a much longer periodof time but, once the oldrulers were finally removed from office, has made democratic progress at a relatively higher rate.

Another set of approximately 15 to 20 countries will continue to be democratic aspirers.  Most will continue to have multiparty elections, but the quality will vary and citizens will continue to believe that there is a significant possibility that their democratic system or certain basic institutions face the real danger of collapse.  Finally, about twenty states—roughly the same number as today—will experience authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule.  These countries may have regularly scheduled multiparty elections but the outcome of those votes will not be in doubt.  Also includedin this category will be the increasednumber of failedstates in Africa that will not have even the mechanisms for voting in place.

There will probably be considerable movement between the last two categories of countries that aspire to democracy and those that have essentially authoritarian rule.  Indeed, given that multiparty elections will continue throughout the continent, there will be relatively few old-style authoritarian states that do not hold elections at all.

The forms of democracy that African countries adopt or aspire to will not be substantially different from the current variety of western practices.  There is, of course, considerable diversity in Western democratic practices (compare Switzerlandto the UnitedKingdom) andAfrican countries will adopt a similar variety of practices.  However, there will not be a palpable form of “African democracy” that is adopted commonly across the continent.

Indeed, it is federalism—a particular form of Western democracy—that is increasingly being adopted across Africa.  Whether federalism is a comprehensive, or even appropriate, answer to Africa’s problems remains unclear.  Federalism is more likely to succeed if the impetus for conflict is ethnic division that has a strong geographic component.  As Africa’s ethnic communities still have a territorial basis, federalism may well work to devolve the locus of resource disputes from the center to the periphery.  In contrast, if African conflicts are more centeredon religion, it will be far more difficult for federalism to be effective because religious identity is less likely to be geographically defined.  Indeed, religious identity is changing quickly in Africa and will therefore thwart many efforts to draw boundaries around defined communities of believers.  The success of federal attempts will depend, too, on the ability and willingness of central governments to permit funding of regional, alternative centers of power and authority.

AIDS

The AIDS trendin Africa will obviously depend on technological developments, especially the

production of a vaccine.  However, even if with relatively optimistic assumptions about a

vaccine andthe roll-out of anti-retrovirals (ARVs), it is clear that there will be very large increases in the number of people who will die in the next ten years.  The rates of infection in Southern Africa are remarkable because no one ten years ago hadpredicted that 35 percent of the adult population (about the levels in SwazilandandBotswana) couldactually be infected.  In other parts of Africa, rates are much lower.  In particular, much of West Africa has yet to see the disease breakout beyond the 5 to 7 percent infection rate.  Why this is so is unclear, but there appears to be an inverse relationship between infection rates andthe percent of the population

that is Muslim.

Progress will undoubtedly continue in the development and provision of relatively inexpensive ARV’s.  However, it is less clear that African countries have the medical systems to deliver the medicines effectively, nor, in some cases, the political will to roll these out.  African countries currently do not provide formal medical care to a substantial portion—sometimes a majority—of their populations.  Ramping up to a high level of ARV provision andmonitoring will present such a substantial challenge that few African countries will be able to meet it in the near term. Moreover, improper distribution of antiretrovirals may prompt the mutation of even more virulent forms of the virus.

For years, the impact of AIDS on political andeconomic systems has been a source of immense speculation.  Since AIDS tends to strike the working populations and the relatively affluent, as opposed to many diseases that afflict the old, the infirm, and the poor, it has the potential to deal a devastating blow to precisely the parts of the workforce where African countries are the

weakest.  Indeed, the figures regarding AIDS prevalence within important institutions are already shocking:  some militaries are reporting that one-thirdof their soldiers are infected, with even higher rates among combat units.

However, it is not at all clear if AIDS can be directly tied to state collapse in the way that was feareda few years ago.  The militaries that have high levels of infectedsoldiers largely work aroundthe virus by releasing those who actually become sick and recruiting others.  The virus also affects rebel groups and other challengers to the state; indeed, the virus may affect those who threaten the state more because they are less likely to have access to medicines.  More generally, connecting the dots between AIDS prevalence andactual political andeconomic outcomes is extremely difficult.  There is no doubt that having a significant percent of the most capable people die has economic costs and is a political burden.  However, the prevalence of

AIDS is highest in Southern Africa but this is also the region that has performed, overall, the best in Africa.  Zimbabwe andAngola, the two poor performers in Southern Africa, can tie their poor governance records directly to the decisions made by their governments rather than damage causedby the virus.

New “Influentials”

The implications of the rise of India and China was another major emphasis in the NIC 2020

report.  China already has a significant impact on Africa as it searches for secure sources of raw materials.  This has had the salutary effect of raising some basic commodity prices.  China does not have clear political interests in Africa beyond waging its continual war against diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.  To date, African leaders have responded to China’s interest in Africa positively, seeing it as an alternative source of investment andcountervailing force to Western interests andinfluence, a perception heightenedby the Chinese practice of offering ‘gifts.’  Over time, however, African states may begin to realize that China’s interest is motivatedless by altruism than by hard-nosedbusiness concerns.  Tensions may be exacerbatedby the flooding of African markets by cheap Chinese goods, with a consequent effect on weak domestic manufacturing bases, and by the presence of larger numbers of Chinese workers in Africa.

Over the next 15 years, there is probably a greater possibility of India developing a distinct foreign policy with political interests toward Africa.  India has the relative advantage of geography and of speaking English.  India also has a strategic interest in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, it is more likely that India will have a foreign policy toward the Indian Ocean littoral

than to Africa in general, as evidenced by the development of the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South

Africa) forum.

At the same time, some of the traditional powers that have engaged Africa are likely to leave the scene gradually.  The generation of French leaders who saw their country’s destiny intertwined with Africa has now retiredandtheir successors see their future in Asia andCentral Europe.  The United Kingdom has been progressively disengaging since independence, even though it will continue to influence the policies of international institutions towardAfrica.

As politics abhors a vacuum, other powers will findAfrica an inviting arena.  Iran, Egypt, other middle range powers may find it relatively easy to maneuver in Africa.  However, it is likely that, overall, there will be less foreign involvement in African affairs, leaving more room for African powers and domestic agents to influence individual countries and the paths of conflict.

Religious Conflict

The NIC 2020 report notes the rise of identity politics everywhere and that communal conflict

will become increasingly important as NGOs and others vie for attention.  Africa has experiencedsome religious conflict to date, especially in Nigeria, but one of the great unansweredquestions is how much more violence religious diversity will promote.  Africa is at the center of many proselytizing efforts worldwide:  the Catholic Church has made Africa a priority while Pentecostal andEvangelical Christian movements spendmillions of dollars on recruiting large numbers of Africans.  Iran has also devoted substantial efforts to fostering its religious andpolitical views in Africa.  Finally, Saudi Arabia has spent large amounts of money to export its exclusionary Wahhabi tradition.

The state system in Africa is unlikely to divide into Muslim versus non-Muslim states, not least because of the split personality of many African states in this respect.  North African states will continue to identify much more with the Middle East and will probably not have active foreign policies towardAfrica.  The interior African states, composedoverwhelmingly of Muslims, are unlikely to pose any threat to their neighbors.  It is highly unlikely, no matter other domestic developments, that Nigeria will develop a distinct identity as a Muslim state, although religious conflict centeredaround Islam within Nigeria is likely to continue.

On the other hand, the states with significant Muslim populations on the East Coast of Africa

(e.g., Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti) may be drawn into the conflict/terror networks emerging out of

the Arabian Gulf.  There are deep historical links between East Africa and the Gulf and continual traffic in people, including, possibly, principals in terror networks.

Rather than explicit conflict fueledby religious extremism, it is likely that the most important relatedtrendin Africa affecting the UnitedStates is the further development of pockets of radical Islam that are hostile to the West andthat actively provide support andsanctuary to international terrorists.  Radical Islam will find explicit support amongst a small but increasing number of

state officials, as is the case in Northern Nigeria today.  More common will be the adherents of radical Islam who find friendly communities grateful for material support from Iran and/or Saudi Arabia, and who can operate with relatively little fear of government detection.

Upside Surprises

While all are low probability, a variety of issues might cause our analysis to be incorrect in certain areas and, more generally, not optimistic enough.  Certainly, if hydrocarbon management were improvedacross the continent, Africa’s future in 2020 wouldlook distinctly more positive.  If Angola, Nigeria, andSudan—three of Africa’s largest andmost important countries—actually began to use their revenues from oil in productive ways, these states would become stronger, tens of millions of Africans wouldbenefit from reducedpoverty, andthe impact on the region might be significant.  Better hydrocarbon management might come about because of international pressure to promote the transparency of resource flows, aided by domestic constituencies who have grown tiredof the fraud associatedwith wasting assets.

Similarly, if agriculture were to show productivity gains in a significant number of countries, there wouldbe a general boost in growth, but also a change in the urban-rural terms of trade that we portray above as generally favoring the cities.  African agriculture could become more productive if it was the beneficiary of the kind of scientific advances that helped Asian

agriculture in the 1960s and1970s.  Africa currently has the lowest level of inputs andthe lowest yields compared to genetic potential of any region on earth.  Thus, in many areas where there is substantial “low-hanging fruit” relatively small amounts of investment couldleadto significant productivity advances.  Of course, the same genetic modification technology that might help African agriculture could potentially hurt the comparative advantage of other African countries. For instance, genetic advances that allowedother countries elsewhere in the worldto grow high quality tropical beverages (cocoa, tea, coffee) wouldhurt many African countries.

Technological developments that allowed Africa to fight AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases in an appropriate manner would also be extremely significant and would probably deflect upwardthe political andeconomic trajectory of some countries.  It is unfortunate to note that, primarily because of AIDS andever-more-resistant mosquitoes, Africa has become a far more unhealthy place than it was 15 years ago.  Technological developments in the next 15 years that allow the continent to regain this lost ground wouldbe vitally important (andprobably surprising) but wouldonly return the region to where it was in the early 1980s.

Another upside surprise that wouldbe of great significance wouldbe the development of regional and internal peacekeeping doctrine and capabilities that wouldallow for more timely interventions in African conflicts andmore decisive resolutions to the wars.  Currently,

peacekeeping efforts in Africa face a variety of problems, from getting rebels to the table, to supplying the correct number of peacekeepers armedin ways that they can actually project force, to finding mediators who are actually willing to call an end to negotiations if progress is not being made.  If the necessary continental or international architecture were to be developed so that war couldbe addressedmore forthrightly, our projections for Africa wouldimprove considerably.  Similarly, if more effective practices of international assistance in developing

local police forces could be found, domestic stability and security may improve, a critical precursor to greater investment andgrowth.

Finally, positive developments in the management of international debt might be helpful to Africa.  The prospects for increasedlevels of investment, both private and public, will be affected by how the continuing high levels of international indebtedness are addressed over the periodof our projection.  There now seems to be a clear consensus that repayment of international debt is not consistent with maintaining adequate levels of economic growth and the international community is exploring different ways to achieve the needed debt relief. Accomplishing this is a necessary, but likely not a sufficient condition, for private sector investment in most countries (apart from the mineral sector), while the public sector resources liberatedby debt relief are in many cases targeted towardhealth and education, among other areas, by the international organizations organizing andpromoting debt relief efforts.

Downside Risks

Other potential developments might accelerate decline in Africa and reduce even our limited optimism.  The most important wouldbe the outright collapse of Nigeria.  While currently Nigeria’s leaders are locked in a bad marriage that all dislike but dare not leave, there are possibilities that could disrupt the precarious equilibrium in Abuja.  The most important would be a junior officer coup that could destabilize the country to the extent that open warfare breaks out in many places in a sustainedmanner.  If Nigeria were to become a failedstate, it could drag down a large part of the West African region.  Even state failure in small countries such as Liberia has the effect of destabilizing entire neighborhoods.  If millions were to flee a collapsed Nigeria, the surrounding countries, up to andincluding Ghana, wouldbe destabilized.  Further, a failedNigeria probably couldnot be reconstituted for many years—if ever—andnot without massive international assistance.

While many other downside risks are imaginable given the precarious state of most African countries, the possibility of some type of ecological downturn shouldbe noted.  Such a large portion of Africa hovers just above poverty and is still so dependent on the land that the continent is still especially vulnerable to changes in climate or the outbreak of new diseases. There is also the possibility for conflict over water among the ten riparian states that comprise

the Nile Basin.  The relationship between Ethiopia andEgypt has been tense for years because of water and, if not handled carefully, this issue has the potential to be the next big conflict in Africa.

Conclusion

Perhaps the central message of this report is that in an age of globalization, local factors will determine Africa’s fate.  Geography, decisions by governments past and present, the presence of trainedprofessionals, the strength of civil society groups promoting democracy, andthe capabilities of the local police andsecurity forces all have the potential to decisively affect the performance of individual African countries in the next 15 years.  Such forces are not determined by international markets in the first instance, although the reaction of global forces to local developments in any of these areas must be considered.  As none of these basic aspects of the political system can be changedeasily, if at all, in as short as 15 years, the most likely prediction is that the current hierarchy of African performers will continue, albeit distributed across an ever broader spectrum.  Globalization may be the “megatrend” of the 21st century but Africa’s

destiny still is to be determined by African circumstances.